Joseph Raz's views are the finest example, in the philosophical literature, of what we might call comprehensive liberalism, a type of liberal political doctrine that spells out comprehensively what the key values in human life are, advocating political principles and institutions that are built upon these values. (John Stuart Mill probably held a similar view, but he does not spell it out with nearly Raz's explicitness and detail.) For Raz, the key personal and political value is autonomy, a power of self-direction and self-government. To this, in his paper for our workshop, he links the acceptance of moral pluralism: one ought to believe, he says, that there are many incompatible ways of living, all of which are good and valuable. Religious and secular toleration, he argues, should be based on an acceptance of the ideal of autonomy and the truth of moral pluralism.
The major alternative to Mill's and Raz's comprehensive liberalism, in the philosophical literature, is the view called "political liberalism." This view was developed first by Charles Larmore in The Morals of Modernity, but in greatest detail by John Rawls in his great book Political Liberalism. I too hold a view of this type: my books Women and Human Development and Frontiers of Justice articulate my own political views (quite different from those of Rawls and Larmore) in the form of a species of political liberalism. So it seems worth exploring the reasons that led the three of us to prefer political liberalism to a view of Raz's type.