5 posts categorized "Miles, Thomas"

March 01, 2011

Co-authorship, Empiricism and Changes in Legal Scholarship

In the 1973 movie The Paper Chase, there is a well-known scene in which the protagonist law student Hart goes with trepidation to the office of the stern Professor Kingsfield.  Hart’s entrance disturbs Professor Kingsfield from his work – reading and writing about the latest developments in contracts law. 

When viewed in 2011, so much of the movie seems dated.  Legal education – and our image of it – have in many ways changed a great deal since then.  Instructors and students no longer accept routine humiliation as an effective pedagogic technique.   In an age of laptops, i-pads, and electronic casebooks, the very notion of a paper chase seems anachronistic. 

While our image of legal teaching has kept up with the times, our image of legal scholarship has remained relatively fixed.  Most of us imagine that today’s law professor still works like Professor Kingsfield.  Alone in the office, the law professor reads cases and statutes, thinks about them, and then writes about them.  We imagine that legal scholarship remains an inherently solitary and essentially literary endeavor.

In a recent co-authored paper, we found that this image of legal scholarship has for some law professors become just as anachronistic as the paper chase.  Some law professors now work in teams to produce scholarship; more and more scholars utilize  statistical methods and other social science techniques rather than purely conceptual analysis in their scholarship. 

 We examined patterns of collaboration and methodology in top law reviews and two faculty-edited law journals.  We found that the fraction of articles in the top fifteen law reviews that were co-authored trended upwards between 2000 and 2010.  What explains this increase in collaborations?  An increase in empirical articles accounted for a substantial share of the growth in co-authored articles, and the correlation between co-authorship and empiricism persisted after controlling for numerous other influences.  

 These patterns are consistent with standard economic predictions about human capital and teamwork: academic collaboration rises with scholarly specialization.  As the complexity of a field grows, more and more diverse types of human capital are needed to make a contribution.  Prior research has found a similar growth in co-authorship in some social science fields, such as economics, but the trend in law toward more collaboration has received relatively little attention. 

 As a further test of whether empiricism spurred more co-authorship in law, we examined the articles published since 1989 in two prominent, faculty-edited journals specializing in law & economics.  Co-authored articles were far more common in these journals than in the general-interest, student-edited law reviews – a pattern which itself is consistent with the specialization hypothesis.  The share of articles without empirical analysis or formal models in these journals plummeted over this period, while co-authorship rose sharply.  These results support the view that specialization, and specifically the growth of empirical scholarship, has contributed to the trend of co-authorship in legal academia.

 Some have given the recent growth in empirical scholarship the moniker Empirical Legal Studies (ELS), and others, including our own colleague Brian Leiter, have criticized it as an incoherent category and removed from the central normative and conceptual questions of law [see also Professor Wright's critique here].  We do not defend or oppose ELS as a category or a distinct legal subfield.  But our evidence suggests that empirical studies of law and legal institutions increasingly occupy an important place in legal scholarship.  Indeed, our results indicate that the expansion of empirical scholarship is one of the major developments in the legal academy during the last generation, and prima facie, we assume that at least some of it is responsive to the central concerns in law.  The growth in co-authored empirical work in particular likely reflects real gains from specialization rather than simply a trend or fad. 

It is no secret that today’s law professors do not conduct their classrooms in the same manner that Professor Kingsfield ran his.  It is also becoming apparent that the scholarship that some of today’s law professors produce and the manner in which they produce it also bear little resemblance to Professor Kingsfield’s approach.

 --Tom Ginsburg and Tom Miles

June 04, 2008

Adam Cox and Thomas Miles: "Judging the Voting Rights Act"

Over on the Columbia Law Review's online Sidebar, Chicago professors Adam Cox and Thomas Miles are involved in a debate about their January 2008 CLR article "Judging The Voting Rights Act." In that piece, Thomas and Adam write that they provided "the first systematic evidence that judicial ideology and race are closely related to findings of liability in voting rights cases." In so doing, they called into question the core findings of Ellen D. Katz & Anna Baldwin's report, "Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982;" Katz and Baldwin responded to Cox and Miles with a reply in Sidebar, and Cox and Miles have responded to that reply with one of their own.

December 12, 2007

Miles and Sunstein Featured on SCOTUSBlog

Over on SCOTUSBlog, Chicago profs Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein discuss their article “Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chevron” in a two-part SCOTUSBlog "Ask the Author" segment. You can read it here.

November 30, 2007

Miles and Sunstein Take a Hard Look at the "Hard Look" Doctrine

Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein, who stirred up some controversy back in October with their op-ed on activism and partisanship on the Supreme Court, have posted a paper on SSRN examining the process by which federal courts review agency decisions for arbitrariness. The abstract is below.

The Real World of Arbitrariness Review

THOMAS J. MILES
University of Chicago - Law School
CASS R. SUNSTEIN
University of Chicago - Law School
University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 368
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 188

Abstract:    
The Administrative Procedure Act instructs federal courts to invalidate agency decisions that are “arbitrary” or “capricious.” In its 1983 decision in the State Farm case, the Supreme Court firmly endorsed the idea that arbitrariness review requires courts to take a “hard look” at agency decisions. The hard look doctrine has been defended as a second-best substitute for insistence on the original constitutional safeguards; close judicial scrutiny is said to discipline agency decisions and to constrain the illegitimate exercise of discretion. In the last two decades, however, hard look review has been challenged on the plausible but admittedly speculative ground that judges' policy preferences affect judicial decisions about whether agency decisions are “arbitrary.” This study, based on an extensive data set, finds that the speculation is correct. Democratic appointees are far more likely to vote to invalidate, as arbitrary, conservative agency decisions than liberal agency decisions. Republican appointees are far more likely to invalidate, as arbitrary, liberal agency decisions than conservative agency decisions. Significant panel effects are also observed. Democratic appointees show especially liberal voting patterns on all-Democratic panels; Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns on all-Republican panels. Our central findings do not show that judicial votes are dominated by political considerations, but they do raise grave doubts about the claim that hard look review is operating as a neutral safeguard against the errors and biases of federal agencies. Because judicial policy commitments are playing a large role, there is a strong argument for reducing the role of those commitments, and perhaps for softening hard look review.

      

October 31, 2007

Thomas Miles and Cass R. Sunstein: Partisanship and Activism on the Supreme Court

(Please note: this essay is also posted at the New Republic Open University blog.)

We have been engaged in a long-term study of judicial voting patterns, and we  recently published an oped in the Los Angeles Times, in which we gave “awards” to Supreme Court justices, based on a statistical study of their votes. The Judicial Neutrality Award went to Justice Anthony Kennedy. The Judicial Restraint award went to Justice Stephen Breyer. The less coveted Partisan Voting Award went to Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Antonin Scalia received the Judicial Activism Award. 

In various circles, our oped seems to have caused a bit of a stir – especially, we suspect, because Thomas emerges as the most partisan justice, and Scalia as the most activist. (But we did not spare liberal members of the Court; Justice John Paul Stevens was a close second for partisanship.) Our goals here are to offer a more detailed explanation of our method, to provide some general remarks on partisanship and activism on the Supreme Court, and to respond to some criticisms.

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