Those Stolen Swiss Paintings - and the Future of "Double Threat" Kidnapping

I fear that kidnapping has improved. It is a crime that has long fascinated those of us, which I think means all of us, who have thought about "perfect crimes." The essential problem facing the kidnapper or extortionist, whether of persons or property, is how to take payment without being traced and apprehended. In movies, the kidnapper makes awful threats and, no doubt, threats by one who has already kidnapped are more credible than those made by evil people with harsh voices who have but threatened a more serious crime. But, in the end, the kidnapper must worry that when he picks up the payment, he will be followed, by one means or another, and then apprehended.

I have long wondered whether the "solution" is in "double threats." The kidnapper might take A and B, and then contact the parent or owner and say "transfer $X to me in the following manner, and then (or before then) I will return A to you; if I am not followed and see that I am safe for Y days, I will then return B to you." This kidnapper is no less credible than the conventional one, because B is otherwise useless to him, and there is the fact that his "reputation" and ability to repeat the crime depends on his freeing B as promised. And the taking, and serial returning, of A and B raises the chance that payment will be made on A. The comparison is to the conventional kidnapper who says "pay me and I will return A, and if you arrest me when I take payment, my confederates will then kidnap or murder B." This is made much more plausible by the possession of B.

Imagine my surprise, or strange sense of intellectual delight, when I read recently of the theft of four well-known painings in Zurich from the E.G. Buehrle Collection. Well-known art is difficult to sell, and the criminal's intent may be to ransom the paintings. Again, how should the criminals arrange to receive payment without being found? Sure enough, although the owners have been silent and said nothing about ransom demands or payments, two or even three of the paintings, but not the most valuable, were soon "found" in an unlocked (!) vehicle within half a kilometer of the vicitimized museum. The newspapers at first reported that the art must have been too big to be carried away undetected. But the more likely story is that the "kidnappers" took A and B, so to speak, and have now returned A. They may or may not return B once they feel that the museum has kept its bargain.

The bad news is that other criminals will learn from this. A hard question is whether this "game" is a stable one. The criminals, or at least a good number of them in the future, must return B, or future victims will not be more likely to pay (and not lead the police to the criminal) to gain the return of A. And yet each criminal has very little incentive to return B. Nor are victims very good at colluding. We might imagine a state making it illegal to pay ransoms, but such a law would be very hard to enforce and it has been tried or thought about very rarely. Still, if the "double threat" crime succeeds, states may need to rethink their tools of combat.

Comments

[The Pathetic Earthling]

I trust Cass Sunstein was not "A" and that some other important figure there at the law school is not "B." Elena Kagan ought not be taken lightly.

[Andrew]

As you say, each individual criminal has very little incentive to return B. In countries with very advanced kidnapping industries, such as in Latin America, repeat players (organized kidnapping syndicates) are able to credibly promise delivery on payment. I recall hearing that it's actually become semi-routinized in countries like Colombia.

[michael webster]

Thomas Schelling has an interesting account of how the market for stolen art works, on page 203 of Choice and Consequence.

It involved the use of agents by the insurance company, who were free to make their own deal with the thief - having already made a deal with the insurance company, the details which were unknown to the thief.

This would appear an easier strategic solution. The game is relatively simple to model.

[Ian]

There is a more immediate problem. For reputation to matter there must be a manner to identify a theif with a successful prior theft and return. If the theive is truly successful and his identity remains mystery, it will be difficult for the theif to prove his identity and gain the benefit of the reputational effects. The solution would most likely require an identifiable characteristic which is difficult to copy but which does not reveal the identify of the theif for purposes of law enforcement. However, there would be great incentives for copycat criminals to work to copy the identifiable characteristic so to benefit from the previous criminals "good" reputation. I imagine that it's likely that this reputational market would fail due to the difficulty of creating it and then maintaining it.